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Threats to our freedom are part of our daily social interactions. They are accompanied by
an aversive state of motivational arousal, called reactance, which leads people to strive
to reestablish their threatened freedom. This is especially the case if the threat seems to
be illegitimate in nature. However, reactance theory suggests that reactance should also
be aroused when people are exposed to legitimate freedom threats. In this article we
first aim to show that both illegitimate and legitimate freedom threats evoke reactance.
Second, we aim to extend past work on reactance by exploring the underlying process
of experiencing a legitimate vs. an illegitimate restriction. In the current study (N =
57) participants were restricted in an illegitimate (unexpected and inappropriate) or
legitimate (unexpected but appropriate) way, or were not restricted at all. We assessed
participants’ experience of reactance, their behavioral intentions to restore their freedom,
their approach motivational states, as well as their physiological arousal (heart rate).
Results indicated that when restricted in an illegitimate or a legitimate way, participants
indicated the same amount of reactance as well as anger. However, when looking
at people’s physiological reactions, important differences between illegitimate and
legitimate restrictions become apparent. Illegitimate restrictions led to an immediate
arousal, whereas legitimate restrictions led to a time delayed arousal. This suggests
that illegitimate restrictions lead to a sudden increase in aversive arousal. Legitimate
restrictions, however, seem to be associated with a more cognitive process in which
people first need to structure their thoughts and reflect upon the situation before getting
into the feeling of reactance in a physiologically arousing sense. Moreover a mediation
analysis could show that behavioral intentions to regain one’s freedom result in positive
and negative approach motivation. In sum we propose a combined dual-process and
intertwined-process model explaining people’s reactions to legitimate vs. illegitimate
restrictions.
Keywords: reactance, restrictions, threat, anger, motivation, social interaction, physiological arousal
Introduction
Imagine the following scenario: you are a future University student and very excited about
beginning your studies next month. Browsing through the rental oﬀers in the internet,
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you come across an advertisement of a lovely ﬂat right next to
the University. You are totally excited about the ﬂat meeting your
expectations and you call the number given in the ad. The land-
lord answers your questions, gives you some information on the
ﬂat and the rental contract, and ﬁnally invites you to a view-
ing. When you mention that you are a University student, the
landlord interrupts you and says: “No, I won’t rent my ﬂat to a
student!” and hangs up.
What’s going through your mind thinking of the described
scenario? Do you feel restricted in your freedom? Do you
suddenly become angry? Do youmaybe recognize a slight tension
in your body? Why do you feel this way? Would you feel diﬀer-
ently if the landlord had explained to you that his past tenants
had been students who had trashed and damaged the ﬂat before
leaving? Would you still be angry? Would an additional justiﬁca-
tion like this override the clear restriction you faced as a student
trying to secure accommodation?
In the current study we investigate how freedom threats
in social interactions shape people’s subsequent reactions.
Furthermore, we are interested in investigating how people react
when being restricted in an illegitimate vs. legitimate way. By
analyzing people’s experience of threat, their behavioral inten-
tions, their self-reported aﬀect and motivation, as well as their
physiological arousal, we aim to explore how reactance processes
in social interactions emerge. Thereby we aim to complement
Dillard and Shen’s (2005) description of reactance as an inter-
twined aﬀective and cognitive phenomenon by adding the impor-
tant factors of motivation and physiological arousal to increase
our understanding of reactance processes.
Reactance Theory
In his publications on psychological reactance, Brehm contends
that restrictions lead to reactance, a so called “motivational
arousal” to re-establish the threatened freedom (Brehm, 1966,
1972; Brehm and Self, 1989). The desire of being ‘free’ again
seems familiar to almost all of us. It is about daily moments (e.g.,
dress regulations) of perceived and actual freedom restrictions
that end upmaking us feel unwell, nervous, and angry. According
to the degree of the perceived restriction, to the context of the
restriction, and to the meaning of the restriction for our future,
we basically react diﬀerently (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm,
1981).
Restrictions often arise in a social interaction context, for
example in our introduction example the restriction happens
in the interaction between the landlord and the student.
Restrictions to people’s freedoms in social interactions have
shown to trigger diﬀerent reactance eﬀects, like counter argu-
ing, source derogations, aggression, or changes in attractive-
ness (e.g., Brehm, 1966; Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Brehm and
Brehm, 1981; Fitzsimons, 2000). Dillard and Shen (2005) have
summarized these reactions in their intertwined-process model,
proposing that reactance is an intertwined process of negative
cognitions (i.e., expression of disagreement with the restric-
tion), and anger aﬀect (i.e., feeling irritated, angry, annoyed,
and aggravated). Testing competing conceptualizations of reac-
tance, Rains (2013) conﬁrmed the proposed intertwined-process
model in a meta-analysis of 20 studies. Compared to single
process models, a linear aﬀective-cognitive model, and a dual-
process model, the intertwined-process model best ﬁtted the
data.
However, what exactly is reactance if it is an intertwined
combination of anger aﬀect and cognition? If we think of dual-
process models and their distinction between a more impul-
sive, aﬀect driven, and a more cognitive dominated reﬂective
modus of social behavior (e.g., Strack and Deutsch, 2004, for
overview Gawronski and Creighton, 2013) – is this distinction
meaningless in the context of reactance? Or can we distin-
guish between more impulsive vs. more reﬂective reactance
processes? Furthermore, as reactance is deﬁned as a motiva-
tional state (Brehm, 1966) we also need to better understand
the role of motivational variables in addition to cognition and
aﬀect within the reactance process. Physiological arousal can be
seen as a factor connected to motivational processes (e.g., Zanna
and Cooper, 1974; Baum et al., 1986). Therefore, in the current
research we compare physiological arousal following diﬀerent
kinds of freedom restrictions (illegitimate vs. legitimate restric-
tions) which should, according to Brehm (1966), both induce
reactance.
Brehm (1966) suggested, for reactance behavior to emerge,
the perceived restrictions do not solely have to stem from illegal
acts. Restrictions that have legitimate justiﬁcations or even lead
to a positive outcome can trigger reactance as well. This means
that a loss of freedom, no matter how well justiﬁed should still
arouse reactance. However, while illegitimate behaviors are unex-
pected, inappropriate, improper, and unjust, legitimate behaviors
are unexpected but appropriate, proper, and just (Tyler, 2006;
Zhang and Sapp, 2013). In this connection, fairness research
suggests that decisions by authorities who are perceived of being
legitimate (i.e., appearing fairer and appropriate) are more likely
to be accepted by the people aﬀected from the decision (Tyler and
Huo, 2002).
To come back to our landlord example, one might ask whether
the student may experience the same amount of reactance or less
reactance depending on whether the landlord gives a justiﬁcation
of his behavior (legitimate restriction) or does not give such a
justiﬁcation (illegitimate restriction). In addition, when looking
at physiological andmotivational measures, there might be diﬀer-
ent kinds of processes when people are confronted with diﬀerent
restrictions to their freedom.
Physiological Arousal and Motivation
Cardiovascular responses such as heart rate (HR) are believed to
be the best indicator of eﬀort eﬀects (see Wright, 2008) and in
general to be a particularly promising method for showing phys-
iological arousal in human beings (Brehm et al., 1964; Croyle
and Cooper, 1983; Elkin and Leippe, 1986; Losch and Cacioppo,
1990; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Robinson and Demaree, 2007;
Butler et al., 2009). Additionally, research showed that eﬀort
inﬂuence on the cardiovascular system is mediated by sympa-
thetic nervous system activity, which is especially well reﬂected
inter alia in heart contractility changes (Papillo and Shapiro,
1990; Berntson et al., 1993; Brownley et al., 2000). Similarly,
Baum et al. (1986) already showed that reactance is associ-
ated with an increased activity of the sympathetic nervous
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 632
Sittenthaler et al. Legitimate vs. illegitimate restrictions
system. Other studies related to learned helplessness demon-
strated that the factor decisive for the increased physiological
arousal, which is associated with one’s motivational intensity to
take action, is one’s expected coping potential (Wortman and
Brehm, 1975; Brehm and Self, 1989; Brehm, 1999). In studies
testing Wortman and Brehm’s model on reactance and helpless-
ness (Pittman and Pittman, 1979; Mikulincer, 1988), a threat
led to depression if people did not expect to be able to take
action but aroused anger if people expected to be able to take
action.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, research has shown that the
possibility for coping with a situation is also related to approach
motivation (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003). Approach motivation
is a state in which people are motivated to move toward some-
thing and as such is related to not only positive but also
negative emotions (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013). In several studies,
Harmon-Jones et al. (2009) demonstrated that anger, a negative
aﬀective state, is related to approach motivation (e.g., Harmon-
Jones and Allen, 1998; Harmon-Jones et al., 2003; Harmon-
Jones, 2004). However, this was found only for conditions in
which people were given the opportunity to resolve the anger-
arousing event (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003, 2006). If reactance is
aroused one believes that he or she could engage in behaviors to
restore freedom and thus, approach motivation should emerge.
Additionally, the emotional state of anger is a central compo-
nent of reactance (Dillard and Shen, 2005; Rains, 2013) and
thus, reactance should lead to a motivational state of approach.
This approach motivational state should then result in people’s
reactant behavior, which means that they try to approach the
restoration of their freedom.
The Present Research
In the present study we aim to investigate diﬀerences in ille-
gitimate and legitimate restrictions by showing that diﬀerent
processes are activated in people experiencing those diﬀerent
restrictions. In line with Brehm (1966), we predict that both, indi-
viduals who experience illegitimate as well as individuals who
experience legitimate threats should experience more reactance
than a control group in which no threat occurs (hypothesis 1).
Given Dillard and Shen’s (2005) intertwined-process model in
which anger plays a central role in all reactance processes, and
the literature on anger being associated with approach moti-
vation (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 2003), we further hypothe-
size that both restrictions evoke a negative approach motiva-
tional state, namely anger (hypothesis 2). So far, we assume
that illegitimate and legitimate freedom threats are approxi-
mately similar concerning their outcomes. However, is there
any diﬀerence regarding the physiological process underlying
people’s responses to freedom threats? Building on the dual-
process model by Strack and Deutsch (2004), we hypothesize
that illegitimate and legitimate threats diﬀer in the way physio-
logical reactions are aroused: as an illegitimate restriction does
not give any justiﬁcation for the threat, people should imme-
diately feel the urge to restore their freedom. This should be
reﬂected in an increase in physiological arousal immediately after
experiencing the restriction. Therefore, an illegitimate restriction
may trigger a fast process immediately leading to the moti-
vational state of reactance accompanied by strong approach
motivation. In contrast, as legitimate restrictions usually give
justiﬁcations for the threat, they ﬁrst may not be experienced
as arousing as illegitimate restrictions. People might ﬁrst need
some time to reﬂect upon the restriction and its justiﬁcation
and to ﬁnd counter-arguments (Dillard and Shen, 2005). We
thus predict that legitimate restrictions are accompanied by a
more cognitive process in which people ﬁrst think about the
restriction leading not to a similar immediate increase in physio-
logical arousal as predicted for illegitimate restrictions. However,
as both legitimate and illegitimate restrictions are predicted
to lead to reactance (Brehm, 1966; Miron and Brehm, 2006)
we propose that legitimate restrictions are also arousing but
only after a delay of thinking and counter-arguing (Dillard
and Shen, 2005). We hypothesize that while illegitimate restric-
tions trigger a more emotional, faster process and thus, an
immediate physiological arousal, legitimate restrictions trigger a
more cognitive, slower process and thus, a delayed physiolog-
ical arousal (hypothesis 3). However, both restrictions should
result in increased anger (and negative thoughts) as predicted
by the intertwined model by Dillard and Shen (2005). Anger
can be seen as an indicator of approach motivation (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2013). As any attempt to solve a threat is an attempt
to restore one’s agency and thus, one’s approach motivation
(Jonas et al., 2014), we should ﬁnd an approach motivational
state at the end of the reactance process. As approach moti-
vation is independent of valence we predict that behavioral
intentions to regain one’s freedom should result in the expe-
rience of a positive and negative approach motivated state
(hypothesis 4).
Materials and Methods
Participants and Design
In this laboratory study, 57 students (41 female and 16 male) with
a mean age of 22.51 years (SD = 4.94, two missing data points)
of the University of Salzburg, Austria, voluntarily participated.
The students had been recruited in several psychological lectures
and at the University campus where they were asked to partici-
pate in a physiological laboratory study. Students were randomly
assigned to one of the three experimental conditions (illegitimate
vs. legitimate vs. control).
Experimental Procedures
Participants in the experiment were asked to participate in
a paper-and-pencil study for approximately 25 min, while
we recorded physiological measurements. The experimenter
explained that she was interested in what happens physiolog-
ically when students read about typical situations in students’
daily life. The students were asked to complete all questions
honestly and silently and were informed about the volun-
tary nature of participation as well as conﬁdential use of
data.
The questionnaire started with some demographic questions
about sex, age, and ﬁeld of study. After ﬁlling out these questions,
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the experimenter attached three “sensors” to the participants’
ﬁngers on the non-dominant hand to measure skin conductance
(SC) and HR during the study. The ﬁngers of the participants
were washedwith alcohol before attaching NeXus 10 sensors (two
measuring SC ﬁxed with Velcrostrip and one single ﬁnger clip
measuring HR) on the ﬁrst, second and third ﬁngers. Participants
were told to try holding their hand as still as possible while ﬁll-
ing out the questionnaire. First a 3-min baseline measure ensured
participants would fully focus on the study. They were told to
calm down and try to relax for the next 3 min looking at the black
screen of the computer. Then participants were asked to care-
fully read and imagine the reactance-arousing scenario (3-min
period). In the illegitimate condition, they were asked to imag-
ine that they were going to start studying at the Paris-Lodron-
University in Salzburg the following semester, and were therefore
looking for an apartment near the University. In a press advertise-
ment they found an appropriate 1-room-apartment downtown.
They called the landlord about viewing the apartment. When the
landlord asked them for their profession, they stated they would
be a student in Salzburg next semester. Before they could say
anything else the landlord interrupted them and stated: “No, you
are a student, you won’t get this apartment” and broke oﬀ the
call (illegitimate condition). By contrast, in the legitimate condi-
tion the volunteers were asked to think of the same situation
described above, but after the landlord had interrupted them he
explained his behavior why he did not like students to rent his
apartment. He explained that he was very sorry for his behav-
ior but that he had bad experiences with student tenants in the
past. In the control condition the students were asked to imagine
that s/he was able to rent the apartment without experiencing any
restrictions.
After participants had read the apartment search scenario, we
assessed participants’ state reactance. The items were arranged
into two diﬀerent scales: experience of reactance (α = 0.89,
seven items, e.g., “To what extent do you perceive the reaction
of the landlord as a restriction of freedom?” and “How much
pressure do you feel as a result of his reaction?,” adapted from
Jonas et al., 2009), and behavioral intentions including evalua-
tion items (α = 0.84, 10 items, e.g., “To what extent would you
describe this man as incompetent to other students?”; “Would
you like to ruin this landlord’s reputation by publishing a nega-
tive review on a respected internet site?”). Answers were given
on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
much)1.
1Items of the Experience of Reactance Scale: to what extent do you perceive the
reaction of the landlord as a restriction of freedom? How much do you feel being
put under pressure by his reaction? Are you frustrated about the reaction of the
landlord? How inadequate do you think is his reaction? How much does his reac-
tion bother you? How illegitimate do you think is the landlord’s reaction? To what
extent are you oﬀended by his reaction?
Items of the Behavioral Intentions and Evaluation Scale: would you ever consider
renting a ﬂat of this landlord in the future? How much would you try to describe
this man as incompetent to other students? How important would it be for you to
argue against the landlord’s reaction? How strong is your wish to complain about
his reaction at the professional association for tenant’s interests? Howmuch would
you advise other students against this landlord? Would you like to severely criti-
cize the landlord in a daily newspaper? Would you like to ruin his reputation by
publishing a negative review on a respective internet site? Do you think that this
For the dependent measure of the physiological arousal in
this study we used SC2 (in micro-mho) and HR (in beats per
minute). Concerning future calculations with the physiological
arousal we diﬀerentiated an immediate response to the threat of
freedom while reading the scenario and a delayed response while
answering the reactance items, which followed the apartment-
search scenario. We used the diﬀerence values between both the
immediate response and the baseline measure (ir-bm), and the
delayed response and the (dr-bm) for further calculations. These
diﬀerence values served as our measures of physiological arousal.
We assessed people’s approach motivation by using the
PANAS (Positive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule consisting of a
negative and a positive emotions scale; Watson et al., 1988).
However, based on prior research showing that some of the
PANAS items are related to approach motivation (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2009; Steindl et al. in preparation) we created a
measure for negative approach motivation, namely anger (upset,
hostile, irritable; α = 0.85), and a measure for positive approach
(active, attentive, inspired, alert, interested, strong, determined;
α = 0.73)3.
At the end of the study, participants were debriefed and
thanked for their participation, and received course credits if
desired4.
landlord could also have prejudices against foreigners? Do you think that the land-
lord also shows discriminatory behavior in other areas? How likely do you think it
is that this man takes advantage of other people?
We also measured the attractiveness of the apartment with one item and the
sympathy for the landlord but did not use those two single items for further
analyses. Participants in the legitimate (M = 1.94, SD = 0.64) and the ille-
gitimate condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.19) rated the apartment as less attrac-
tive compared to participants in the no restriction control group (M = 3.63,
SD = 0.96), F(2,54) = 14.78, p < 0.001, η2ρ= 0.35. Furthermore participants
showed less sympathy for the landlord in the two experimental conditions (ille-
gitimate: M = 1.65, SD = 1.04; legitimate: M = 1.61, SD = 0.61) compared to the
control group (M = 3.68, SD = 1.00), F(2,54) = 32.08, p< 0.001, η2ρ= 0.54.
2For the measure of SC, we found neither a signiﬁcant interaction (F(2,54) < 1,
p = 0.703, η2ρ= 0.01) nor a signiﬁcant main-eﬀect of the restriction manipulation
F(1,54) < 1, p = 0.420, η2ρ= 0.03; point of measure x restriction). Thus we did
not include the measure in further analyses. Solely, we found a main-eﬀect for
the within factor (immediate vs. delayed response), F(1,54) = 31.98, p < 0.001,
η2ρ= 0.37. Participants showed less SC at the second point of measure (delayed
response,M = 0.35, SD = 0.53) compared to the ﬁrst point of measure (immedi-
ate response, M = 0.80, SD = 0.90). However, this is not surprising, considering
the fact that we used two sensors of NeXus 10, which only could be ﬁxed with
Velcrostrip on the ﬁngers of the participants. This method is much more error-
prone than the use of real electrodes, such as Beckman Ag/AgCI electrodes used
by other biofeedback-instruments (Losch and Cacioppo, 1990; Eisenberg et al.,
1991). However, this is not surprising considering the fact that we used two sensors
of NeXus 10, which only could be ﬁxed with Velcrostrip on the ﬁngers of
the participants. This method for measuring SC is much more error-prone than
the use of real electrodes, such as Beckman Ag/AgCI electrodes used by other
biofeedback-instruments (Losch and Cacioppo, 1990; Eisenberg et al., 1991).
3The scale is based on Egloﬀ et al. (2003), who originally proposed three posi-
tive factors: activation (active, attentive, inspired, alert), interest (interested, strong,
determined), and joy (enthusiastic, excited, proud). However, due to a reliability of
the interest factor of only α = 0.50 we combined the two factors activation and
interest and termed it positive approach factor. Of the remaining three items of the
positive PANAS scale we built the factor joy (enthusiastic, excited, proud; α= 0.84).
Of the remaining seven items of the negative PANAS we built the factor negative
emotions (distressed, scared, jittery, guilty, ashamed, nervous, anxious; α = 0.75).
However, as approach motivation is a crucial concept in this article we only focus
on the negative approach factor (anger) and the positive approach factor.
4For explorative analyses we measured the subscales “Victim Sensitivity” and
“Observer Sensitivity” from the “Justice Sensitivity Inventory” by Schmitt et al.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 632
Sittenthaler et al. Legitimate vs. illegitimate restrictions
Results
Reactance Measures
To test hypothesis 1 that both illegitimate and legitimate restric-
tions lead to reactance we conducted univariate analyses of vari-
ance for the experience of reactance and the behavioral intentions
measures separately. Means and error bars (95% CI) are displayed
in Figure 1.
Experience of Reactance
As expected, participants in the illegitimate (M = 3.84,
SD = 0.58) and the legitimate condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.50)
scored higher on the experience of reactance measure than
participants in the control condition (M = 2.19, SD = 0.84),
F(2,54) = 38.94, p < 0.001, η2ρ= 0.59. Subsequent post hoc anal-
yses showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between both the illegitimate
and the legitimate condition compared to the control condition
(ps < 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
illegitimate and the legitimate condition (p = 0.761).
Behavioral Intentions
As expected, participants in the illegitimate (M = 3.20,
SD = 0.64) and the legitimate condition (M = 3.14, SD = 0.60)
scored higher on the behavioral intentions measure than partic-
ipants in the control condition (M = 2.09, SD = 0.57),
F(2,54) = 20.38, p < 0.001, η2ρ= 0.43. Subsequent post hoc
analyses showed that both the illegitimate and the legitimate
conditions diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the control condition
(ps < 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
illegitimate and the legitimate condition (p = 0.779).
Approach Motivation – Anger and Positive
Approach
To investigate hypothesis 2, stating that both, illegitimate
and legitimate restrictions evoke approach motivation, we
conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with
the PANAS scales’ negative approach motivation (anger) and
(2005) as well as the “Collectivism and Individualism” scales by Triandis and
Gelfand (1998).
FIGURE 1 | Experience of reactance and behavioral intentions in the
three experimental groups.
positive approach factor. We found a signiﬁcant eﬀect for anger,
F(2,54) = 9.56, p < 0.001, η2ρ= 0.26. Participants in the ille-
gitimate (M = 3.35, SD = 0.96) and legitimate condition
(M = 3.19, SD = 1.10) scored higher on anger than partici-
pants in the control condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.07), p < 0.001,
and p = 0.001, but participants in the illegitimate and legit-
imate condition did not diﬀer from each other, p = 0.628.
However, we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for people’s posi-
tive approach, F(2,54) = 2.32, p = 0.108, η2ρ= 0.08, indicating
that participants in the illegitimate (M = 2.98, SD = 0.46),
legitimate (M = 2.76, SD = 0.76), and control condition
(M = 3.23, SD= 0.59) showed about the same amount of positive
approach.
Physiological Measures
Heart Rate
To test hypothesis 3, whether illegitimate restrictions lead
to an immediate physiological response whereas legitimate
restrictions lead only to a delayed physiological response, we
performed a mixed-model ANOVA for the time of measurement
(immediate physiological response vs. the delayed physiologi-
cal response) as within-subject factor and the kind of restric-
tion (illegitimate vs. legitimate vs. control) as between-subject
factor. We found a signiﬁcant main-eﬀect of the restriction
manipulation, F(2,54) = 3.40, p = 0.041, η2ρ= 0.11. Post hoc
analyses indicated that participants in the illegitimate condi-
tion (M = 3.72, SD = 0.76) showed a greater physiological
response compared to participants in the control condition
(M = 0.90, SD = 0.78), p = 0.012 but not compared to partic-
ipants in the legitimate condition (M = 2.56, SD = 0.80),
p = 0.296. Participants in the legitimate and control condition
did not diﬀer either, p = 0.142. We further found a main-
eﬀect for the within factor (immediate vs. delayed response),
F(1,54) = 13.37, p = 0.001, η2ρ= 0.20. Participants showed
more physiological arousal at the second point of measure-
ment (delayed response, M = 3.02, SD = 4.21) compared to
the ﬁrst point of measurement (immediate response, M = 1.81,
SD = 3.29).
Furthermore and most importantly, we found the predicted
interaction (point of measure × restriction), F(2,54) = 3.67,
p = 0.032, η2ρ= 0.12. Simple eﬀects within the illegitimate
[F(1,54) = 0.43, p = 0.517, η2ρ= 0.01] and control condition
[F(1,54) = 1.96, p = 0.168, η2ρ= 0.04) showed that partici-
pants’ physiological arousal did not diﬀer in the immediate
and delayed response. However, within the legitimate condi-
tion [F(1,54)= 17.55, p < 0.001, η2ρ= 0.25], participants showed
much more physiological arousal in the delayed compared to the
immediate response condition. Moreover, within the immediate
response condition, legitimately restricted participants showed
about the same level of physiological arousal as participants in
the control condition, p = 0.427. Participants in the illegiti-
mate conditions displayed higher physiological arousal values
compared with participants in the control (p = 0.003) and
the legitimate condition (p = 0.029). Following the delayed
response condition, participants in the illegitimate (p = 0.068)
and legitimate condition (p = 0.053) tended to display higher
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arousal values compared with participants in the control condi-
tion. Participants in the illegitimate condition displayed about
the same level of physiological compared to participants in
the legitimate condition, p = 0.950. These results support
our hypothesis. Means and SD as well as error bars (95%
CI) are displayed in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.
Moreover, correlations with all measured variables are displayed
in Table 2.
Approach Motivation
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the attempt to restore freedom leads
people to come back into an approach state. Using the soft-
ware Process 2.11 (Hayes, 2013, model 6), we performed two
serial multiple mediation analyses, one with positive approach
and one with negative approach (anger) as a dependent variable.
First, we employed Contrast A (illegitimate vs. control condition,
legitimate condition as a covariate) and Contrast B (legitimate
condition vs. the control condition, illegitimate condition as a
covariate) as the independent variables, positive approach as
the dependent variable, and reactance experience and behavioral
intentions as the two mediators. We used a 95% bias corrected
bootstrap conﬁdence interval (95% BC CI) and 5000 bootstrap
samples. We found that the illegitimate threat did not have a
signiﬁcant total eﬀect on positive approach, b= −0.25, SE= 0.21,
t(54) = −1.16, p = 0.250. The legitimate condition, however, had
a negative eﬀect on positive approach, b = −0.47, SE = 0.22,
t(54)= −2.15, p= 0.036, indicating that the legitimate restriction
led to a lower positive approach. The eﬀects for both restrictions
was non-signiﬁcant when the potential mediators experience
of reactance and behavioral intentions had been added to the
prediction, b = −0.31, SE = 0.31, t(54) = −1.01, p = 0.320 and
b = −0.52, SE = 0.31, t(54) = −1.72, p = 0.091. The boot-
strapped indirect eﬀects of the illegitimate and the legitimate
freedom threat via experience of reactance and behavioral inten-
tions was signiﬁcant in a positive direction, b = 0.36, SE = .19,
BC CI [0.03, 0.80] and b = 0.34, SE = .19, BC CI [0.04, 0.82]
(for the path coeﬃcients see Figure 3). Thus, both restrictions
which ﬁrst arouse an experience of reactance that further led
to behavioral intentions to restore one’s freedom resulted in a
ﬁnal positive approach state suggesting that approach had been
restored.
TABLE 1 | Means and SD for the ANOVA as a function of the experimental
manipulation: immediate response and delayed response concerning
heart rate (HR).
Immediate responsea Delayed responseb
Manipulation M SD M SD
Illegitimate
condition
Legitimate
condition
3.54
(n = 20)
1.30
(n = 18)
3.26
2.30
3.91
(n = 20)
3.83
(n = 18)
4.48
3.17
Control
condition
0.49
(n = 19)
3.49 1.31
(n = 19)
4.46
a Immediate response = HR reading the scenario – baseline measure (difference
value); bDelayed response = HR answering the reactance items – baseline measure
(difference value).
FIGURE 2 | Physiological arousal for the immediate and delayed
response in the three experimental groups.
Second, we performed the same analyses but this time with
negative approach (anger) as the dependent variable. We found
that both, the illegitimate as well as the legitimate threat had a
total eﬀect on anger, b = 1.35, SE = 0.33, t(54) = 4.05, p < 0.001
and b = 1.19, SE = 0.34, t(54) = 3.46, p = 0.001. The eﬀects
for both restrictions were reduced when the potential media-
tors experience of reactance and behavioral intentions had been
added to the prediction, b = −0.70, SE = 0.29, t(54) = −2.39,
p = 0.020 and b = −0.77, SE = 0.29, t(54) = −2.67, p = 0.010.
The bootstrapped indirect eﬀects of the illegitimate and the legit-
imate freedom threat via experience of reactance and behavioral
intentions on anger were signiﬁcant, b = 0.74, SE = 0.20, BC CI
[0.32,1.44] and b = 0.71, SE = 0.22, BC CI [0.27,1.51], indicat-
ing that both restrictions ﬁrst arouse an experience of reactance
that further led to behavioral intentions to restore one’s freedom
and ﬁnally resulted in a negative approach state, namely anger
(for the path coeﬃcients see Figure 4). Furthermore, the indi-
rect eﬀects of both threats on anger via experience of reactance
were signiﬁcant as well, b = 1.20, SE = 0.29, BC CI [0.55, 2.15]
and b = 1.15, SE = 0.28, BC CI [0.54, 2.13], indicating experi-
ence of reactance and behavioral intention as mediators for both
restrictions on anger.
These results support our hypothesis that behavioral inten-
tions that aim to regain one’s freedom should result in approach
motivation, positive or negative.
Discussion
Discussion of the Results
In the current research we explored eﬀects of illegitimate and
legitimate freedom threats in social interactions on people’s
subsequent reactions to those threats. We hypothesized that
although both illegitimate and legitimate freedom threats arouse
the experience of reactance, they should diﬀer in their physiolog-
ical arousal eﬀects. Supporting our hypotheses and conﬁrming
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TABLE 2 | Mean and SD and correlation for all dependent variables in the different groups.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1) Experience of reactance Illegitimate
Legitimate
Control
3.84
3.78
2.19
0.58
0.50
0.84
–
–
–
(2) Behavioral intentions Illegitimate
Legitimate
Control
3.20
3.14
2.09
0.64
0.60
0.57
0.57∗∗
0.60∗∗
0.75∗∗
–
–
–
(3) HR immediate Illegitimate 3.54 3.26 0.07 –0.23 –
Legitimate 1.30 2.30 –0.05 –0.05 –
Control 0.49 3.49 0.18 0.02 –
(4) HR delayed Illegitimate 3.91 4.48 0.32 –0.02 0.82∗∗ –
Legitimate 3.83 3.17 –0.04 –0.08 0.66∗∗ –
Control 1.31 4.46 0.18 –0.11 0.80∗∗ –
(5) Anger Illegitimate 2.98 0.64 0.67∗ 0.69∗ –0.20 0.05 –
Legitimate 2.76 0.76 0.66∗ 0.68∗ –0.10 –0.21 –
Control 3.23 0.59 0.87∗ 0.84∗ 0.08 0.02 –
(6) Positive approach Illegitimate 3.35 0.96 –0.17 0.15 –0.17 –0.19 0.10 –
Legitimate 3.19 1.10 0.53∗ 0.66∗ –0.39 –0.33 0.59∗ –
Control 2.00 1.07 –0.23 –0.29 –0.58 –0.44 –0.14 –
(7) Skin Conductance (SC)
immediate
Illegitimate 0.92 0.81 0.04 –0.07 0.15 –0.18 –0.20 0.28 –
Legitimate 0.69 0.74 –0.29 0.05 0.32 0.29 –0.09 –0.02 –
Control 0.77 1.14 –0.03 –0.06 0.60∗ 0.51∗ –0.10 –0.48 –
(8) Skin Conductance delayed Illegitimate 0.55 0.63 –0.14 –0.11 0.15 –0.26 –0.33 0.24 0.91∗ –
Legitimate 0.24 0.36 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.16 –0.18 0.14 0.50∗ –
Control 0.24 0.53 –0.16 –0.12 0.45 0.26 –0.09 –0.38 0.86∗ –
a Immediate response = HR reading the scenario – baseline measure (Difference value); bDelayed response = HR answering the reactance items – baseline measure
(Difference value); ∗p < 0.05, two-tailed. ∗∗p < 0.01, two-tailed.
FIGURE 3 | The effect of freedom restrictions on negative approach (anger) via experience of reactance and behavioral intentions. †p < 0.10,
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Brehm’s (1966) assumption, results indicated that both kinds
of restrictions evoked experienced reactance and behavioral
intentions to restore one’s freedom, for example by thinking
about ruining the threatening man’s reputation or describing him
as incompetent to others. Moreover, both restrictions led to the
same amount of experienced anger, which is a key component of
psychological reactance (Dillard and Shen, 2005).
However, with regard to people’s physiological arousal,
our ﬁndings point to diﬀerent underlying processes. While
illegitimate freedom threats led to an immediate increase in HR,
legitimate freedom threats led to a delayed increase in HR. We
assume that illegitimate restrictions may be followed by a more
automatic arousal. Legitimate restrictions, however, may ﬁrst be
followed by a more cognitive process and only after a delay be
followed by a physiological arousal. Thus, people in the ille-
gitimate condition may immediately feel their emotions boiling
over. They are physiologically aroused and activated to “ﬁght” for
their freedom. People in the legitimate condition seem to need
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FIGURE 4 | The effect of freedom restrictions on positive approach via experience of reactance and behavioral intentions. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
some more time to recognize the landlord’s unobvious restric-
tion. After this delay in time they are able to enter the arousal
state. Dual process theories might help to further understand
the underlying mechanisms between these diﬀerent processes.
Dual process models distinguish between more impulsive, auto-
matic and more reﬂective, controlled processes. As stated by
Bargh (1994) automatic processes are typically unintentional
and require little amounts of cognitive resources. Conversely,
controlled processes are intentional and require considerable
amounts of cognitive resources (see Gawronski and Creighton,
2013). Thinking of the landlord scenario, people in the legitimate
condition may need more cognitive resources for understanding
the restriction as a limitation of their freedom and for argu-
ing against the restriction. Building on Strack and Deutsch’s
(2004) reﬂective–impulsive model (RIM) of social behavior we
thus propose that illegitimate restrictions are associated with
the impulsive system, and legitimate restrictions are associated
with the reﬂective system. However, both processes seem to be
related to anger and counter arguing. In both restriction condi-
tions participants show experience of reactance and behavioral
intentions – as the intertwined model by Dillard and Shen (2005)
suggests. If people are confronted with restrictions to their free-
dom, they feel the motivation to restore that freedom – no matter
if the restriction has been illegitimate or legitimate. However, the
process how to regain freedom might diﬀer. Being confronted
with an illegitimate restriction, participants immediately feel an
aversive arousal. They feel their anger, experience reactance, and
show behavioral intentions to restore their freedom. This may
further lead to approach motivation and restore people’s agency.
With regard to legitimate restrictions, however, the picture seems
to be less clear. People do not like the restriction but there is an
obvious and justiﬁed reason for the restriction. This could mean
that people ﬁrst have to reﬂect upon and argue against the restric-
tion before getting into the same arousal state as people of the
illegitimate restriction. When they are given the opportunity to
restore their freedom, i.e., they intend to behave in a reactant
way, positive approach motivation emerges. However, they expe-
rienced lower positive approach than people in the illegitimate
condition. Yet, as this positive approach state has been achieved
in both restrictions only after intending to behave in a freedom-
restoring way, reactance seems to be functional in both restriction
situations. These ﬁndings suggest that only after reactance has
been aroused and demonstrated by behavioral intentions, one
experiences a feeling of regained approach motivation. Deriving
out of this, defensive behaviors may be important in order to
experience one’s agency again (Jonas et al., 2014).
Implications, Limitations, and Future
Research
In the current study we were able to show that illegitimate and
legitimate freedom threats share their outcomes – they both
arouse similar amounts of experience as well as behavioral inten-
tions. Moreover, they both evoke negative emotions (anger) and
positive emotions with an approach motivational character. Most
importantly, our ﬁndings highlight the usefulness of explor-
ing people’s physiological reactions. By looking at people’s HR,
we found important diﬀerences between the two threats. Those
would not have shown by looking at behavioral indicators only.
As Wright (2008) stated, physiological arousal is a good indica-
tor of eﬀort eﬀects and as such predicts people’s motivation to
achieve their goals (Brehm and Self, 1989). As we found a phys-
iological diﬀerence between the two restrictions we also assume
that people’s eﬀort to restore their freedom diﬀers. However, we
did not test whether there are diﬀerences in people’s actual eﬀorts
but only measured intentional behavior. Future research might
consider assessing real behavior in order to investigate people’s
eﬀorts to restore their freedom.
One further limitation of this study is that we did not include
more of the relevant measures in a time sequence. For exam-
ple, we did not measure negative (and positive) aﬀect immedi-
ately after the freedom restriction but only following the reac-
tance measures. Moreover, we did not incorporate a manipu-
lation check for (il)legitimacy after both scenarios. For future
research this would be useful to get a better insight into the
timing of both cognitive and aﬀective responses. Following the
intertwined model research, counter arguing is one important
part of the reactance process (Dillard and Shen, 2005; Rains,
2013). Therefore, the perception of (il)legitimacy could have
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changed during the reactance process. We suggested that partic-
ipants in the legitimate restriction condition ﬁrst had to think
about the given situation embedded in the social interac-
tion. The landlord did not want to let the ﬂat to students
because he had made bad experiences with students. However,
participants could have tried to argue against the landlord’s
reason not to hire the ﬂat to students thinking of being a
very proper and correct student himself/herself. Therefore it
could be that those participants also had experienced a time-
delayed arousal feeling of “illegitimacy” in the legitimate restric-
tion5.
One might also ask whether the delayed physiological
response to the legitimate restriction could be partly explained
by the fact that more information had to be processed in the
legitimate condition when thinking about the reasons provided
for the landlord’s behavior. As this study is only a ﬁrst step in
understanding the underlying mechanisms and the considera-
tions of the dual-process vs. intertwined model, future research
should focus on shedding further light on the underlying mech-
anisms in illegitimate and legitimate restrictions. Strack and
Deutsch (2004) show that both, the impulsive and reﬂective
system, operate in parallel. However, the impulsive system
enjoys priority over the reﬂective system because the latter only
operates under conditions of suﬃcient cognitive capacity. The
information processing in the impulsive system is assumed to
be independent of resources. Consequently, we would predict
that for example a cognitive load task (e.g., remembering a
seven digit number) may inﬂuence legitimate (more “reﬂec-
tive”) but not illegitimate (“more impulsive”) restrictions of
freedom.
When looking at the intertwined model of reactance (Dillard
and Shen, 2005) in which reactance is deﬁned as a combination of
aﬀect and cognition, one might be surprised that their deﬁnition
misses a crucial factor: motivation. Brehm stated that reactance
is “a motivational state and as such is assumed to have ener-
gizing and behavior-directing properties” (Brehm and Brehm,
1981, p. 98). Therefore, motivation is a very important factor
that cannot be ignored. By adding the motivational components
of physiological arousal and approach, our research attempts to
better grasp the phenomenon of reactance.
During experiencing reactance and behaving in a reactant way,
approach motivation seems to play an important role (see also
Steindl et al., in preparation). It is deﬁned as an “impulse to
go toward” (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013, p. 291) and has been
found in states sharing a motivational but not necessarily an
emotional direction. Thus, anger (negative valence) and determi-
nation (positive valence) share the motivation to approach rather
than avoid (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 2009, 2011). Believing in
5Following Jonas et al. (2009) our measure of reactance also included one item
measuring participants’ feeling of illegitimacy. When we ran a factor analysis
for the seven experience of reactance items of our reactance measure we found
that the “illegitimate”-item highly loaded on the extracted experience of reac-
tance scale (0.73). Therefore, it is not surprising that following the time delay
in which participants had the opportunity to counter-argue the freedom restric-
tion they experienced about the same amount of “illegitimacy” in both restriction
conditions.
one’s ability to take action is a prerequisite for approach motiva-
tion to emerge (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003, 2006). As reactance
motivates people to take action on restoring their freedom, they
should feel capable to do so. Without the belief in one’s coping
abilities, helplessness rather than reactance would emerge and
thus, avoidance motivation would be more likely. As approach
motivation is often assessed by frontal alpha asymmetry in EEG
studies (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 2010), one could elaborate on
the ﬁndings of this study and explore frontal alpha asymme-
try in reactance processes. This would be especially interesting
with regard to the question if illegitimate and legitimate freedom
restrictions diﬀer.
One critical limitation of our research is that we only used a
scenario for the experimental manipulations to evoke reactance.
Onemight question to what extent it is possible for participants to
solely imagine how they might feel if they are restricted in their
freedom. However, the ﬁndings of the current study reveal that
in addition to indicating a strong experience of reactance and
behavioral intentions to restore their freedom, participants even
showed a physiological response – although they were confronted
only with a scenario. Therefore, we assume that we were able
to arouse reactance with scenarios only. However, it would be
useful for future studies to replicate the present ﬁndings using
real illegitimate vs. legitimate restrictions.
Conclusion
In sum, the present study helped to get ﬁrst interesting new
insights into understanding the underlying mechanisms of ille-
gitimate and legitimate restrictions of freedom. To better under-
stand reactance processes, we added the important factors of
motivation and physiological arousal (already mentioned by
Brehm, 1966) to Dillard and Shen’s (2005) description of reac-
tance as an intertwined aﬀective and cognitive phenomenon.
First, we showed that both illegitimate and legitimate freedom
threats evoke similar amounts of reactance. Second, extending
past research on reactance theory, we found that illegitimate
restrictions lead to an immediate physiological arousal and legit-
imate restrictions lead to a time delayed physiological arousal.
However, in order to provide a complete picture of the underlying
processes of illegitimate and legitimate reactance processes and
how these restrictions aﬀect interaction processes, more research
is needed. It is crucial to investigate the underlying processes of
diﬀerent forms of threat (illegitimate vs. legitimate) to enhance
our understanding of social interaction processes.
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